Fixed-effects regressions of the effects of the reputational and financial rewards offered on practice performancea
| Reputational reward offered | Financial reward offered | |
|---|---|---|
| Effects pooled over 2004–2005 to 2012–2013 (95% CI) | 0.184 (0.149 to 0.219) | 0.214 (0.181 to 0.246) |
| Year-specific effects | ||
| 2004–2005 | −0.121 (−0.220 to −0.022) | 0.797 (0.614 to 0.979) |
| 2005–2006 | 0.048 (−0.047 to 0.144) | 0.427 (0.315 to 0.539) |
| 2006–2007 | 0.077 (0.008 to 0.146) | 0.341 (0.279 to 0.403) |
| 2007–2008 | 0.190 (0.116 to 0.263) | 0.366 (0.286 to 0.446) |
| 2008–2009 | 0.206 (0.131 to 0.281) | 0.262 (0.188 to 0.337) |
| 2009–2010 | 0.236 (0.156 to 0.316) | 0.168 (0.093 to 0.243) |
| 2010–2011 | 0.245 (0.160 to 0.329) | 0.169 (0.047 to 0.291) |
| 2011–2012 | 0.244 (0.180 to 0.307) | 0.137 (0.091 to 0.184) |
| 2012–2013 | 0.209 (0.147 to 0.271) | 0.092 (0.045 to 0.138) |
↵a Observations: 3 032 176. Standard errors are adjusted for 367 749 practice–indicator clusters. Control variables not shown: year dummies, registered population of the practice, physicians per 1000 registered patients, and local area deprivation.