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Sorting out the Seeking: The Economics of Individual Motivations

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Abstract

Various models of individual motivations are confronted with evidence from different kinds of laboratory experiments. The motivations distinguished are categorized as selfish, other regarding, or cooperative. The experimental evidence shows that the traditional, selfish model is too limited, but that the alternative models that have been suggested each have shortcomings of their own.

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Schram, A. Sorting out the Seeking: The Economics of Individual Motivations. Public Choice 103, 231–258 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005036003561

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